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Abstract
This paper empirically evaluates the impact of bank capital on lending pat-
terns of commercial banks in the United States. We construct an unbalanced
quarterly panel of around seven thousand medium sized commercial banks over
sixty quarters, from 1996 to 2010. Using two different measures of capital namely
the capital adequacy ratio and tier 1 ratio, we find a moderate relationship be-
tween bank equity and lending. We also use an innovative instrumenting method-
olgy which helps us overcome the endogeneity issues that are common in such
analyses. Our results are broadly consistent with some other recent studies that
have analyzed US banking data.
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1 Introduction
The banking sector is one of the most regulated ones today and bank capital regulation
is of utmost importance. The commercial banks in the United States face capital
requirements based on the the Basel Core Banking Principles. The government of the
United States is still in the implementation phase of Basel III guidelines. The banks
in the United States have to hold about eight percent capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2)1
as a fraction of it’s risk weighted assets. They do not default at eight percent but
are declared undercapitalized. The regulatory authority, which is the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation in the context of the USA, takes over the bank only if the bank
capital is less than two percent of the risk weighted assets in which case the bank is said
to be critically undercapitalized. The cost of defaulting or even being undercapitalized
could be substantial. It could lead to the bank’s franchise being revoked, in the worst
case scenario. Obviously, the bank would take steps to ensure such a state never occurs.
Hence they take decisions on how much capital to hold and this choice is indeed a
difficult one for reasons that will be discussed later in the paper. Banks do not have
complete control over their regulatory capital asset ratios simply because the returns on
the assets are stochastic. Thus the banks hold buffers to absorb such negative shocks. In
a bad state of nature, this buffer will act as a cushion and prevent the capital ratio going
below the minimum stipulated ratio. Therefore, the regulators would want the banks
to hold more capital so that it can act as a protection in bad times. Also having more
capital means that the bank will have enough resources to lend and thereby mitigating
the procyclicality problem associated with capital requirements.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, there has been some work that tries to
explore the linkages between financial and real sectors. The effect of changes in bank
capital on lending decisions is the primary determinant of the linkage between financial
1Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a regulator’s point of view.
It primarily consists of common stock and retained earnings. It may also include non-redeemable
non-cumulative preferred stock. Tier 2 capital represents supplementary capital such as undisclosed
reserves, general loan-loss reserves and subordinated debt.
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conditions and real activity. This paper takes a step towards quantifying this important
relationship. During the financial crisis, when the likelihood of a credit crunch was still
under debate, the relation between bank capital and bank lending was a key policy
concern. Likewise, when the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) moved to inject
capital into banks through the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), the impact of the
program on real activity largely focused on the effect of these injections on bank lending.
More recently, this question has re-emerged in light of proposals announced by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to raise banks’ capital requirements and
limit leverage ratios, Berropside and Edge (2010).
There are not many recent estimates for the U.S of the impact of changes in bank
capital on lending. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 recession, many observers debated
whether the newly introduced capital regulations along the Basel guidelines were hin-
dering lending. Although this debate did not yield a concensus, it did result in the
development of empirical models that sought to quantify the effect of bank capital on
bank lending. For example, Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994) estimated models relating
changes in individual banks’ loan growth to measures of loan demand and bank capital.
Similarly, Berger and Udell (1994) specified an equation relating the growth rate of
various bank assets to different measures of bank capital ratios. Finally, Bernanke and
Lown (1991) developed state-level equations linking bank loan growth to bank capital
ratios and employment, for a single state (New Jersey).
In this study, we mainly ask one question. We ask how the bank capital affects
the lending decisions of banks. Our sample only includes commercial banks. The data
comes from the Call Reports database, maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago. We conduct the analysis only for the middle eighty percent of banks, by total
assets. In other words, we discard the top and bottom ten percent. The rationale
for adopting this strategy has been discussed in section 3. The numbers we obtain
are substantially smaller than suggested in statements by US treasury officials post the
financial crisis. The reasoning that Berropside and Edge have in their paper, reconciling
the two sets of results, applies to our case as well and so for the benefit of the reader,
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we put forward the justification here.
The statements from the US Treasury suggest that a $1 increase in bank capital
leads to a $8 - $10 increase in lending capacity. These magnitudes are reasonable
once we make the assumption that banks actively manage their assets to maintain a
constant leverage. This view is based on a scetterplot from Adrian and Shin (2007).
We reproduce this figure below. The sample period used in figure ?? is 1963 to 2006,
Figure 1: Asset and Leverage Growth (1963-2006)
the same as that employed by Adrian and Shin. The constant leverage ratio is apparent
from the scatterplot. This suggests a very active management of assets by commercial
banks. This implies that a change in bank capital has a magnified effect with the scaling
factor equal to the leverage ratio.
Now, how do we compare our regression results with the Adrian-Shin scatterplots?
We must acknowledge the major structural change that took place in the banking sector
following the introduction of the Basel Banking Accord, in 1989. Our sample starts from
1996 while Adrian and Shin sample start from 1963. To find out what effect this choice
of sample period has on the analysis, consider the figure ?? below, from Berropside and
Edge (2010).
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Figure 2: Asset and Leverage Growth (Pre & Post Basel)
The left panel shows relation between asset and leverage growth prior to Basel
(1963:Q1-1989:Q4) and this is consistent with the Adrian and Shin assumption. The
interesting part is the right panel which plots data post Basel i.e 1990:Q1-2008:Q3. As
can be seen from comparing these plots, the feature of the data that has led to the
view that commercial banks actively manage their assets to maintain constant leverage
is much more of an artifact of the early part of the sample and is considerably less
evident in the latter part. Indeed, in the latter part of the sample, there is no obvious
correlation between asset and levearge growth.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. Primarily we are interested in quantifying
the relationship between bank capital and our measure of lending. As explained earlier,
this is an important policy question while dealing with the subject of real and financial
sector linkages. Secondly, we develop an innovative instrumenting methodolgy that
helps us address the endogeneity issues related with the simultaneous determination of
bank capital and lending, by banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature, section
3 describes the dataset we use, section 4 explains the empirical model, variables and
methodolgy, section 5 presents the estimation results and section 6 concludes. The
graphs and tables are placed in the appendix.
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2 Related Literature
The impact of bank capital on lending is one of the key questions that arises when
we want to explore macro-financial linkages. It is hence surprising that there are not
many recent estimates for the United States of the impact of changes in bank capital on
lending. In the aftermath of the 1990-91 recession, Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994)
estimated models relating changes in individual banks’ loan growth to measures of loan
demand and bank capital. The methodolgy developed in Hancock and Wilcox (1993)
could be problematic and a bit difficult to interpret for the following reason. They
measure response of lending to excess/shortfall of capital from a target ratio. The issue
here is that this equation could be misspecified. If the target is poorly specified, then the
excess/shortfall is also poorly specified. Berger and Udell (1994) specified an equation
relating the growth rate of various bank assets to different measures of bank capital
ratios. Finally, Bernanke and Lown (1991) developed state-level equations linking bank
loan growth to bank capital ratios and employment, for a single state (New Jersey).
If we look beyond the United States, there are some studies that seek to quantify
this relationship between bank equity and credit extension. Peek and Rosengren (1997),
Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2010) use loan applications from German Landesbanks to
examine the effect of shocks to capital on the supply of credit by comparing the per-
formance of affected and unaffected banks. Gianetti and Simonov (2010) use Japanese
data to perform a similar exercise concerning bank bailouts. These papers do find a
relevant role for capital in determining loan volumes, although they do not explicitly
compare the magnitudes of the effects they find with those implied by the constant
leverage view. Another group of papers use firm and bank loan-level data; these in-
clude Jimenez, Ongena, and Peydro (2010), who use Spanish data, and Albertazzi and
Marchetti (2010), who use data on Italy. These papers find sizeable effects of low bank
capitalization and scarce liquidity on credit supply.
The papers using Spanish and Italian data find a larger value for the impact of
capital on loans. Santos and Winton (2010), using US loan level data (syndicated
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loans), obtain relatively small effects of bank capital on lending. Also, Elliot (2010)
uses simulation based techniques to find small effects of capital ratios on loan pricing
and loan volumes for U.S. banks. De Nicolo and Lucchetta (2010) use aggregate data
for the G-7 countries and conclude that credit demand shocks are the main drivers of
bank lending cycles. Our magnitudes of this effect are modest and appear consistent
with other papers that employ U.S. data.
3 Data and Stylized Facts
For this analysis we prepared an unbalanced panel of commercial banks balance sheet
data. Our data covers sixty quarters from 1996:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The data is obtained
from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income, referred to as the Call Reports.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requires all regulated financial institutions
to file periodic information. These data are maintained and published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago.2
The appendix provides a detailed documentation of the data. Regulatory capital
requirements have undergone a few changes ever since their inception in the late 1980s.
In 1985-1986, banks had to hold a primary capital exceeding 5.5% of assets. By the end
of the decade, this rose to 7%. Effective December 31, 1990, the banks were required to
hold a total capital of 7.25% as a fraction of risk weighted assets with the Tier 1 capital
being at least 3.25%. These ratios were further increased to 8% and 4% following the
implementation of Basel I in the end of 1992. Then on, these ratios have remained
fairly stable. In our sample, we do not encounter such sudden changes.
Table 1 in the appendix gives the summary statistics of the data. We have 343,752
observations on commercial banks in the United States. We ignore the top and bottom
deciles. To elaborate, we rank the banks by average size (measured by log of total
assets) over the sample period and then drop the top decile and bottom deciles. The
2Historic data from 1976 to 2010 is available at the Chicago Federal Reserve website. Beginning
with the March 31, 2011, call reports are only available from the FFIEC Central Data Repository’s
Public Data Distribution site (PDD)
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reason for adopting this strategy stems from our instrumenting methodology. We use
the real estate exposure of a bank times the change in real estate prices as an instrument
for bank capital. The land price change acts as the exogeneous shock in our model. The
bigger banks in the US are sufficiently diversified and do not respond to local land price
changes as their medium sized counterparts. The idea behind dropping the smallest
banks was that these banks show unusually high capital ratios. This is because they
have limited or no access to capital markets and retain a substantial share of their
earnings. Further, the smallest banks are extremely small as a percentage of total
bank assets and do not add to our analysis. We think that it is only the relatively
smaller/medium sized banks that are more sensitive to local land price movements. We
only include banks that have a capital adequacy ratio less than or equal to 25%. We
also drop the banks if we find that the loan growth rate exceeds 50% in a particular
quarter. Having said that, it is indeed interesting to see if there is a difference in
behavior among banks of different sizes. As pointed out earlier, we found a major
difference in assets once we sorted banks and the contrast was stark at the two points
at which we truncated the data. Within the remaining 80% of banks, we then divide
them at the median and call them big and small for the rest of the analysis. To make
it explicit, hereon when we refer to ‘whole sample’, we mean the medium sized banks,
‘big’ implies the banks above the median in the sample and similarly for ‘small’ banks.
As the table shows, we study two different measures of capital, namely the capital
adequacy ratio (CAR) and the tier 1 capital ratio. We work with a host of loan to asset
ratios in this paper. The loan data we gather comprises loans made to the real estate
sector, commercial and industrial loans, agricultural loans and loans to households.
LTANR shows the loan to assets ratio where we leave out real estate loans and include
the other three categories. LTAR is the loans made to the real estate sector normalized
by total assets. The mean real estate lending as a fraction of total assets is about
47% which is quite substantial. The banks are sufficiently exposed to the real estate
sector and hence their bank capital should be a lot more sensitive to real estate3 price
3We use real estate price and house price interchangeably in the paper.
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movements.
The other variables we have are the growth in the house price index (g −HPI). It
shows that on average the real estate prices have risen by about 7.4%, in the sample
period. This data was collected from the FRED database. The liquidity is just the
securities that the bank holds at any given point in time divided by total assets. Loans
and securities are the two major components of the bank assets. Chargeoffs are a
measure of risk in the banks balance sheet. They are simply the natural logarithm of
loan chargeoffs in the given quarter. We use the GDP growth rate as a macro control
variable in the regression analysis and as a control for the demand size effects that exist,
as is common in the literature.
We now look at some stylized facts in the data. It is useful to look at some of the
key variables, in our analysis, for the US at four different points in time, within our
sample. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the loan to asset ratios of banks in our
sample. Figures 4-6 show how the distribution of bank capital has changed over time.4
It clearly shows that towards the end of the sample there are many more banks who
operate at low levels of capital. The fourth panel represents this all the more being after
the financial crisis during which the balance sheets of most banks shrunk leading to a
loss in equity. The mass to the left of the 10% capital level has increased irrespective of
the measure of capital we use. Figures 7 and 8 show the time series of these variables.
The grey bands show the NBER recession dates. This helps us understand the behavior
of these variables over time. It is clear how the house prices and the bank capital fell
dramatically during the recent financial crisis. We show all three measures of bank
capital as discussed earlier.
4 The Empirical Framework
The empirical model we wish to estimate is the following:
4We also report the equity asset ratio here. This is just the common equity normalized by total
assets.
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LTANRsi,t = αi + νs + βKi,t + γ1BSCi,t−1 + γ2Macrot−1 + ui,t (1)
Where,
• LTANRsi,t is the loan to asset ratio of bank i at time t, with headquarters located
in state s. Here the loans are all the loans made by the bank except the real
estate loans. To elaborate on this point a little more, the loans included in this
variable are the industrial/commercial loans, loans to individuals and the loans
to agriculture. The only other major lending sector is the real estate sector which
is not included in LTA, the reason for which will be outlined below.
• K is a measure of bank capital. We will be working with two different measures
of capital. First, we use the capital adequacy ratio which is the Tier 1+ Tier 2
capital as a fraction of risk weighted assets. Second, we use the Tier 1 ratio.
• BSC consists of lagged bank specific controls which include liquidity and log of
loan chargeoffs
• Macro controls for the state of the overall macroeconomy i.e. aggregate shocks.
We use the growth rate of real GDP as the control. Following the literature, this
also helps us account for demand side factors. We can thus exclusively focus on
a supply sided mechanism.
• αi and νs are the bank and state fixed effects respectively.
4.1 Endogeneity Issues and IV Estimation
We are aware that the equation above suffers from a potential endogeneity problem.
The equation (1) above assumes that the bank sequentially decides first on how much
capital to hold and then how many loans to make. In practice, however, this might
not be a reasonable assumption. We think that such decisions are not sequential but
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simultaneous. Hence we find a suitable instrument for bank capital. Our instument is
the banks exposure to the real estate sector. Our first stage regression is the following:
Ki,t = α + θLTAR
s
i,t−1 ∗%∆LPt + controlsi,t−1 + vi,t (2)
Here,
• LTAR is the average loans made to the real estate sector over total assets in the
last three quarters. It measures the exposure of a bank to this particular sector.
The greater the exposure, the greater will the bank capital be sensitive to real
estate price movements.
• LP is the real estate price index at the state level. We use the percentage change
in LP.
• controlsi,t−1 includes bank specific and macro controls as discussed earlier.
Here we instrument bank capital by the interaction between the change in real estate
prices and real estate exposure of the bank. If the real estate prices in a particular state
increase, then the impact on bank capital depends on the banks exposure to the real
estate sector. If a bank has sufficient exposure to the real estate market, a rise in land
price means that the value of its assets have risen and that in turn means that the bank
now has greater equity, liabilities roughly remaining unchanged. On the other hand, if
the bank has limited exposure to the real estate sector, this appreciation in land prices
will have a much subdued impact on its capital. We report the regression results later
to prove the validity of the instrument but it is clear that our instrument is correlated
with the bank capital and uncorrelated with the error because our dependent variable
is the loans made to all sectors except the real estate sector. This is not correlated with
land price movements or loans made to real estate in the last three quarters.
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5 Regression Analysis
We report the fixed effects instrumental variable estimation results of the model. We
also report the first stage regression results in the IV estimation.
Table 2 shows the first results for the impact of bank capital on lending. This is the
baseline specification and we add controls sequentially here. Columns (1)-(4) use the
capital adequacy ratio as the measure of capital while columns (5)-(8) use the tier 1
capital ratio. Columns (1) and (5) include no additional controls in the regression. The
magnitude of β is significant at the 1% level. We see that on introducing controls, the
coefficient remains significant at the 1% level.5 The baseline results show a subdued
impact of bank capital on lending. A 1% point increase in the CAR leads to an increase
in the loan to asset ratio in the range of 0.04% and 0.08%. We think that is quite a
small impact given that a 1% point increase in the capital adequacy ratio is quite a
substantial increase.
Table ?? shows the results of our main IV estimation. The dependent variable is still
the loan to asset ratio where the loans exclude those made to real estate sector. The first
two columns show results from our entire sample which is all commercial banks except
the top and bottom decile. The next two columns show results from banks above the
median and the last two columns show results for banks which are below the median.
We also use the two measures of capital for each of the three samples. We include state
fixed effects in the regression to capture within state changes. We also include lagged
macroeconomic and bank specific controls. However, before we discuss the results listed
in this table, perhaps we should briefly comment on the first stage regression which is
the direct estimation of equation (2). The results are shown in table ??. We use the
percentage change in real estate prices times the three quarter average of real estate
loan to asset ratio as the instrument. The two columns predict the CAR and the tier
1 capital respectively. The sign on the instrument is positive and significant at the 1%
level, which means that with a rise in asset values, the bank capital increases, assuming
5We use lagged liquidity and chargeoffs as bank specific controls and lagged GDP growth as the
macro control variable.
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that liabilities are roughly unchanged.
Now let us look at table ?? in detail. The coefficient on the capital ratio remains
positive and significant at the 1% confidence level, mostly. We find a moderate response
of lending to bank capital. As discussed earlier, the magnitudes are much smaller than
those suggested by Adrian and Shin (2007) but are in agreement with other papers
that use US data and where the sample period starts after the introduction of the
Basel Banking Accord in 1989. The other thing to note is that the effect of capital on
lending is bigger for the relatively bigger banks. The reason could be as follows. The
bigger a bank gets and the more capital it has, it can make more loans than a smaller
bank. Bigger banks tend to enjoy greater acccess to financial markets and government
guarantees than smaller banks. Hence their LTA responds more to capital than their
smaller counterparts. For the whole sample, we find that a 1% increase in capital leads
to an increase in the LTA which ranges between 0.08% and 0.14% depending on what
measure of capital we use. For the sample above the median, the results are a bit
mixed. This effect 0.13% for CAR and we lose significance when we use the tier 1 ratio.
For the smaller banks, the range is between 0.05% and 0.07%. Berropside and Edge do
not consider separate studies for the different groups of banks as we do but using bank
holding company data, they also suggest a low impact of bank capital on lending.
6 Conclusion
This paper seeks to quantify the impact of bank capital on lending as this is one of the
key policy questions while analyzing financial-real sector linkages. Using a subset of the
commercial banks in the United States and an innovative instrumenting strategy, we
find a modest impact of bank equity on lending behavior. Our estimates are broadly
consistent with other recent studies in the literature that have worked on US data.
Some earlier papers do report much higher estimates but they do not account for the
structural change in the banking sector following the introduction of the Basel Core
Banking Principles.
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Appendices
A Data Description and Regression Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
All All All Big Big Big Small Small Small
variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
CAR .1540 .1357 .0629 .1495 .1326 .0587 .1704 .1492 .0737
LTA .6618 .6804 .1423 .6692 .6878 .1389 .6353 .6513 .1509
Tier 1 Cap .0944 .0877 .0285 .0925 .0865 .0268 .1015 .0933 .0329
LTAR .4728 .4787 .1691 .4905 .4978 .1641 .4087 .4013 .1712
LTANR .1890 .1692 .1197 .1786 .1589 .1166 .2266 .2101 .1231
%∆LTAR .0052 .0034 .0602 .0046 .0034 .0567 .0069 .0035 .0711
%∆LTANR -.0062 -.0077 .0931 .0046 .0033 .0567 -.0045 -.0061 .0984
%∆HPI .0074 .0092 .0169 .0074 .0092 .0174 .0071 .0091 .0148
Liquidity 4.1156 4.1896 1.8572 4.6479 4.7361 1.8235 3.5333 3.6109 1.7135
Chargeoffs .2102 .1830 .1447 .2028 .1772 .1357 .2175 .1902 .1528
%∆GDP .0064 .0067952 .0070901
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Figure 3: Distributions of the Loan to Asset Ratio
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Figure 4: Distributions of the Capital Adequacy Ratio
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Figure 5: Distributions of the Tier 1 Capital Ratio
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Figure 6: Distribution of the Equity to Asset Ratio
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Table 4: First Stage Regression
(1) (2)
CAR T1 Cap
VARIABLES All All
LTAR ∗ %∆LP 5.740*** 3.258***
(1.487) (1.086)
L.logcharge 11.438*** 0.537**
(0.509) (0.250)
L.liqui -0.059*** -0.123***
(0.008) (0.006)
L.growth 14.924*** 5.394***
(1.077) (0.662)
Constant 14.775*** 10.913***
(0.127) (0.062)
Observations 126,467 126,467
Number of id 6,820 6,820
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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